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IN 2018, RUSSIA’S RELATIONS with the West continued to deteriorate, marked by the 
investigations into electoral interference in the US and the Skripal poisoning affair in the UK. On 
the Asian front, however, significant regional and global powers, including China and India, 
remained sanguine regarding the trajectory of relations with Russia. 
The relationship with China is still the mainstay of Russia’s engagement with Asia. 
Debates continue as to whether the close relationship with the superpower-in-waiting is a 
question of Russian subordination to Chinese grand strategy, or more a relationship of equals 
seeking to manage their respective regions.1 China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) gathered 
pace, and the BRI–Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) agreement is due to come into force in early 
2019. Still, questions were increasingly being asked as to whether Russia would in fact benefit 
from the project in economic terms, and whether it was wise to be so tightly bound to China in 
terms of trade and energy deals. Nevertheless, Chinese demand for natural gas has increased, and 
the first exports via the Power of Siberia pipeline are due in December 2019. 
Bilateral trade turnover was US$ 67.5 billion for January–August 2018, up 25.7% over 
the same period in 2017.2 But the bulk of Russian exports to China remained raw materials, in 
particular in the Far Eastern FEDERAL DISTRICT of Russiawhich in the 1990s had been 
securitized as “raw materials appendages” of a China sometimes accused of seeking to revise the 
                                                 
1 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Russian-Chinese Relations in Eurasia: Harmonization or Subordination?” Briefing Paper 
238, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russian-chinese-relations-in-
eurasia>, accessed November 25, 2018. 
2 “Russia-China Trade Turnover up 25.7% in Jan–Aug 2018,” TASS. 
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“unequal treaties.” In 2018, similarly, some Russian governors in the region adjoining China 
sought to make political capital from the geopolitical and geoeconomic anxiety regarding 
China’s economic presence. 
Chinese investment in Russia remains minimal, in part due to the poor investment climate 
and undue bureaucratization. Chinese bankers were cautious, avoiding Russian clients due to the 
sanctions risk.3 Thus, the longer-term substance of Russia’s “pivot to the East,” as an alternative 
to the West in economic terms, is called into question. 
While Russia has often professed the need to maintain a diversity of partners in Asia, this 
has proved more aspiration than reality. Still, India, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula were all 
objects of Moscow’s diplomatic efforts in 2018, and Russia’s agreement on a strategic 
partnership with ASEAN, as well as President Vladimir Putin’s attendance at the East Asia 
Summit in Singapore in November 2018, showed some interest in moving beyond China. Russia 
discussed a free trade agreement between the SCO and ASEAN, although trade and investment 
from ASEAN countries is paltry, while Russia remains the biggest seller of weapons to Southeast 
Asia.4 
Moscow’s relationship with New Delhi, which had begun to seem more symbolic than 
substantial, in particular given India’s closer relations with the US and the rolling out of THE 
US’S “INDOPACOM”, THE ALL-ASIA SECURITY STRATEGY THAT NOW EXPLICITLY 
INCLUDES INDIA, [QUERY: FOR READERS, EXPLAIN BRIEFLY] showed signs of 
                                                 
3 “Novoe kitaiksoe predubezhdenie,”  “CHINA’S NEW BIAS” Kommersant, October 24, 2018, 
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3779051>, accessed December 2, 2018. 
4 Jun Suzuki and Tomoyo Ogawa, “Russia Draws Closer to Southeast Asia with Arms and Energy Trade,” Nikkei 
Asian Review, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Russia-draws-closer-to-Southeast-Asia-with-
arms-and-energy-trade>, accessed December 3, 2018. 
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strengthening. At an informal summit between Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 
2018, it was agreed that the “special and privileged strategic partnership” between the two was 
an important factor for global peace and stability. The sale to India of SU-27 fighter jets was a 
reminder of Moscow’s traditional prioritization of India in the arms sector, as well as of the fact 
that despite the close security relationship, the US would not supply India with F-35s. 5  In 
September, India concluded a US$ 2.2 billion deal to buy four warships from Russia. This came 
a few days after India’s signing of the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement 
with the US, demonstrating their close strategic relationship, one that could sit uneasily with 
closer relations with China and Russia.6 
China nevertheless maintained its position as chief purchaser of Russia’s arms exports. 
Negotiations with Japan over the territorial issue limped along. Viewed against the longue durée 
of Russo–Japanese diplomacy, one could be forgiven for thinking relations were a case of plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose, as Putin dangled the possibility of a resolution of the islands 
dispute, yet always stopped short of any concrete concessions. Japan’s continued interest in 
negotiations, at a time when Russian territorial integrity appears more sacrosanct than ever, 
seemed puzzling. It can partly be explained by Japanese concern over the deepening Sino–
Russian relations, in particular in the military sphere. 
This deepening was exemplified by the Vostok 2018 military exercises held in Russia in 
September (timed to coincide with the end of the Eastern Economic Forum), in which 300,000 
Russian troops took part, plus 3,000 Chinese soldiers. Views on the significance of the exercises 
                                                 
5 Vasily Kashin, “The Current State of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation,” CNA Occasional Paper, 
<https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DOP-2018-U-018184-Final.pdf>, accessed October 11, 2018. 
6 Saurabh Mishra, “India’s Response to its Strategic Conundrum,” Asia Dialogue: China Policy Institute Blog (email 
newsletter), September 30, 2018, University of Nottingham, UK. 
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have varied, with some suggesting they show that the relationship has all the features of an 
alliance, and others pointing out that in reality this was a Russian exercise with a few Chinese 
exercising alongside.7 It does seem that Russia wished to showcase its military might, and in 
particular the fruits of its campaign in Syria, where it has for the first time projected power at the 
global level, leading to speculation that China seeks to learn from the Russian experience in 
Syria.8 Understandably, then, Japan is wary of the two powers working together in such a way, a 
view echoed in the US National Defense Strategy Commission report in November.9 
China and Russia might be expected to speak with one voice regarding the Korean 
Peninsula, but the tendency has been for only Russia to attempt to push for an easing of 
sanctions.10 Both states have suffered from the restrictions on North Korean labor, in particular in 
the Russian Far East, where North Koreans have worked for decades. These laborers are widely 
perceived as more reliable and hardworking than their Russian or Central Asian counterparts, and 
                                                 
7 Roger McDermott, “Moscow Showcases Vostok 2018: Fact, Fiction and Hyperbole,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, 
no. 126, <https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-showcases-vostok-2018-fact-fiction-and-hyperbole/>, accessed 
November 10, 2018. 
8 “China Declares Vostok 2018 War Games Exercise a Success as Troops Are ‘Toughened up for Battle’,” South 
China Morning Post, September 17, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2164592/china-
declares-vostok-2018-war-games-success-troops-are>, accessed November 20, 2018. 
9 United States Institute of Peace, “National Defense Strategy Commission Releases Its Review of 2018 National 
Defense Strategy,” November 13, 2018, <https://www.usip.org/press/2018/11/national-defense-strategy-
commission-releases-its-review-2018-national-defense>, accessed December 1, 2018. 
10 “Morgulov prizval uchest’ interesy KNDR v oblasti bezopasnosti “MORGULOV CALLS FOR NORTH 
KOREAN SECURITY INTERESTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT” Ria Novosti, October 9, 2018, 
https://ria.ru/world/20181009/1530306042.html 
accessed November 1, 2018. 
 6 
have largely replaced Chinese workers, who no longer show much interest in settling in the 
Russian Far East. Their numbers fell from around 7,500 in 2017 to 1,000 in 2018.11 
In the West Asian direction, the Peace Mission exercises in 2018 involved India and 
Pakistan for the first time as new members of the SCO; 3,000 troops from Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan took part, as well as Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The exercises 
were hailed by the SCO’s secretary-general, Rashid Alimov as proof of its growing “global 
profile,” noting “the importance of the SCO’s expanding trans-regionality from the Pacific to the 
Baltic and from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian Ocean” in the light of the accession of India and 
Pakistan.12  
In terms of regional security in Central Asia, diplomacy relating to Afghanistan was 
centered mainly on the contact group meetings involving only Russia, China, and Pakistan. The 
new rationale for the SCO appears elusive, but with the accession of India and Pakistan, the SCO 
summit in June 2018 revealed some differences between members on priorities. The Chinese 
dominance of the SCO and the diverging views of China and Russia on SCO objectives over the 
years remain a problem. Previously, the division of labor within Central Asia appeared clear, as 
                                                 
11 Andrei Lankov, “North Korean Workers and their Russian Employers: Observations from Vladivostok,” NK News, 
November 22, 2018, <https://www.nknews.org/2018/11/north-korean-workers-and-their-russian-employers-
observations-from-vladivostok/>, accessed November 30, 2018. 
12 R. Alimov, ‘Mnogoplanovoe sotrudnichestvo v ramkakh ShOS opredelyaet vector obshcheregional’nogo 
razvitiya” General’nyi sekretar’ ShOs prinyal uchastie v mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii v Shankhae,” 
“MULTIVECTOR COOPERATION WITHIN THE SCO FRAMEWORK  WILL  DETERMINE THE 
PACE OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SCO TOOK PART IN 
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN SHANGHAI” September 17, 2018, 
<http://rus.sectsco.org/news/20180917/465421.html>, accessed October 17, 2018. 
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the Chinese tended to try to push the SCO in an economic direction, while Russia emphasized 
political and security aspects. Yet China shows signs of becoming a more political actor, with 
officials making speeches that hint at a more proactive and engaged approach to ideas about 
regional international order, a development that is a cause of anxiety in Moscow. Thus China 
used the SCO summit to highlight the role of the SCO vis-à-vis the BRI, and to remind members 
that the organization transcends “outdated concepts such as clash of civilizations, Cold War and 
zero-sum mentality.”13 Given Indian hostility to the BRI, this linkage of the BRI with the SCO 
may be unwelcome there. 
=s1CENTRAL ASIA 
In Central Asia, 2018 was a year of both change and continuity. Most of the change revolved 
around the change in leadership in Uzbekistan, although each Central Asian state contributed to 
the dynamics of change and continuity in the region. In Kazakhstan, for example, ambivalent 
relations with Russia continue to mark Astana’s foreign policy. On the one hand, there is the 
clear recognition that Russia and Kazakhstan are strategic partners and that their alliance, which 
stands on solid historical, economic, and political ground, will continue to evolve.14 On the other 
hand, the heavy economic sanctions that Western countries have imposed on Moscow have 
contributed to a sharp devaluation of the tenge (the Kazakhstani currency) and an 
underperforming economy.15 The downward trend in the economic conditions of Kazakhstan can 
                                                 
13 “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 18th SCO Qingdao Summit,” Xinhua, 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/10/c_137244587.htm>, accessed November 30, 2018. 
14 “Nursultan Nazarbayev Meets with Vladimir Putin,” Qazaq Times, May 15, 2018, 
<https://qazaqtimes.com/en/article/39856>. 
15 KazakhSTAN 2.0, “Nazarbayev Said: ‘We Are Not with Putin’,” March 5, 2018, 
<https://kz.expert/en/news/analitika/467_nazarbayev_said_we_are_not_with_putin>; “Currency Devaluation Places 
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also be attributed to disputes with Moscow over the unauthorized transit of Ukrainian goods to 
Kazakhstan through Russian territory, in the context of what is still, in many respects, an ill-
functioning EEU. Kazakhstan showed renewed engagement with its Central Asian neighbors by 
hosting a “consultative meeting” of the Central Asian states in Astana in March 2018. Relations 
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have improved, especially in the economic, political, and 
cultural spheres.16 The strategic partnership between the two countries has been reaffirmed, 
the trade turnover soared by 52% in the first half of 2018, and mutual recognition of visas 
has been established, thus creating a mini Central Asian “Schengen”.  
For Kyrgyzstan, 2018 was marked by Bishkek’s [QUERY: OK?] CHANGED welcome 
and long-overdue rapprochement with Tashkent, exemplified by the signing of a new treaty 
regulating their border, consultative meetings on military and cultural issues,17 and a staggering 
rise in trade turnover as compared to the Karimov era. Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Kazakhstan, 
despite well-known rhetorical discourse on nomadic and Altaic brotherhood, continue to be 
strained over issues pertaining to cross-border trade in the framework of the EEU, often due to 
problems concerning phytosanitary standards of goods. Bishkek has also managed to maintain 
cordial and warm relations with Tajikistan, but the chronic problems on their border, with 
frequent episodes of intercommunal violence, have not been solved. On a more international 
level, Kyrgyzstan has remained in the orbit of Moscow for matters pertaining to security, even 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kazakhstan Central Bank under Pressure,” Financial Times, September 15, 2018, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/48495ba8-579f-11e5-a28b-50226830d644>. 
16 Embassy of Uzbekistan in New Delhi, “Shavkat Mirziyoyev Met with Nursultan Nazarbayev,” March 15, 2018, 
<http://www.uzbekembassy.in/shavkat-mirziyoyev-met-with-nursultan-nazarbayev/>. 
17 “Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan Plan to Hold Second Meeting of Leaders of Border Areas,” November 15, 2018, 
<http://kabar.kg/eng/news/kyrgyzstan-and-uzbekistan-plan-to-hold-second-meeting-of-leaders-of-border-areas/>. 
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discussing the prospect of a second Russian military base in the country,18 while being an active 
economic partner with China. 
Looking at Tajikistan, the launch of the Roghun Dam is the most significant event of 
2018. After protracted negotiations with regional and international partners, and after 
overcoming extremely strong opposition to the project from the late President Karimov, 
President Emomali Rahmon successfully inaugurated the operation of the dam on November 16 
(President Day in Tajikistan).19 The realization of the project, which is still in its infancy, is 
certainly linked to a political and diplomatic atmosphere in Central Asia that differs remarkably 
from the past. With the change of leadership in Uzbekistan, Dushanbe has found in its neighbor a 
cooperative partner, and no longer a staunch opponent. Between the two countries, trade is now 
on the rise, cultural exchanges are now the norm, and border disputes have been regulated and 
contained thanks to the use of international law instruments.20 At the same time, not all is rosy 
for Rahmon. Recent insurgencies in northern Afghanistan have made it imperative to coordinate 
strategically with Moscow and other Central Asian neighbors to protect the border and prevent 
the penetration of Taliban and other radical elements into Tajik territory. Moreover, from a 
domestic viewpoint, renewed tensions in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region have 
raised tensions, especially after a recent episode of violence in a prison in Khujand, for which 
                                                 
18 “Kyrgyz President Says Russia Undecided on Second Military Base,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 6, 
2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-russia-second-military-base/29082637.html>. 
19 “Tajikistan Inaugurates Mega-Dam,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 16, 2018, 
<https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-dam/29604625.html>. 
20 Office of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, “High-Level Meeting between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
within the State Visit of the President of Tajikistan to Uzbekistan,” August 17, 2018, 
<http://www.president.tj/en/node/18190>. 
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ISIS claimed responsibility.21 
2018 has been rather uneventful for Turkmenistan. Yet, this apparent stasis may be seen 
to conceal the dynamics of potential (violent) change. More and more evidence of food shortages 
and mounting lack of crucial basic goods such as bread is being gathered and presented to the 
international community, despite the notorious secrecy of the Turkmen government. The Russian 
newspaper Izvestiya recently characterized the situation as comparable to that in Venezuela, 
calling it Turkmenezuela, in what is arguably a diplomatic and reputational blow to Ashgabat.22 
In an unprecedented move, the government acknowledged the situation by ending the free 
provision of crucial services like petrol and gas, which was customary and institutionalized under 
the presidency of Saparmurat Niyazov.23 
 Another element that may lead one to think that the Turkmen government is finally 
taking measures to contain the economic crisis is the resumption of gas deliveries to Russia. 
Such a move derives from effective diplomacy and lobbying by Gazprom, ending what has been 
so far an almost exclusive commercial relationship between Turkmenistan and China. Even more 
interestingly, Turkmenistan is discussing the development of trans-Caspian pipelines from 
                                                 
21 Catherine Putz, “Inmates Killed in Tajikistan Prison Riot,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2018, 
<https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/inmates-killed-in-tajikistan-prison-riot/>. 
22 “Turkmenesuela: bogateishuyu postsovetskuyu respubliku shtormit,” (“Turkmenesuela: the richest postsoviet 
republic is in the eye of the storm”) Izvestiya, October 28, 2018, <https://iz.ru/804812/igor-
karmazin/turkmenesuela-bogateishuiu-postsovetskuiu-respubliku-shtormit>. 
23 Toymyrat Bugayev, “The Gas Man Cometh: In Turkmenistan, Free Energy No More,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, November 11, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/turkmen-energy-consumers-get-shock-
treatment/29594173.html>. 
 11 
Turkey to Turkmenistan via Azerbaijan. 24  President Gurbanguly Mälikgulyýewiç  
Berdimuhammedov has made sure to maintain good relations with all of Turkmenistan’s Central 
Asian neighbors, in particular Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, despite a recent row over 
the construction of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Tajikistan railway, which, according to the 
Tajik government, is no longer necessary, despite half of it already having been built.25 
Uzbekistan is certainly in the spotlight when it comes to assessing 2018 in Central Asia. 
One might argue that most of the changes in the region have been catalyzed by the proactive 
multilateralism pursued by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in the last two years. Uzbekistan first 
launched the idea of institutionalizing a yearly consultative meeting of Central Asian leaders to 
discuss matters pertaining to the politics, security, environment, and development of the region. 
Uzbekistan has also opened up its borders, de-mining the border with Tajikistan, removing visa 
regimes with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, entrenching border demarcation and collaboration with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and even reaching an agreement with Kazakhstan on the mutual 
recognition of visas, creating a sort of embryonic Central Asian Schengen area.26 This new 
commitment to a liberalization of the Central Asian space, at least in economic terms, has found 
its direct consequence in the resumption of talks with international financial institutions, such as 
                                                 
24 Ministry of Transport, Communications and High Technologies of the Republic of Azerbaijan, “Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan Signed Bilateral Documents,” November 22, 2018, 
<http://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/447/azerbaijan-turkmenistan-signed-bilateral-documents>. 
25 Catherin Putz, “Did Tajikistan Just Ditch a Rail Project with Turkmenistan?” The Diplomat, September 25, 2018, 
<https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/did-tajikistan-just-ditch-a-rail-project-with-turkmenistan/>. 
26 “Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan Sign Mutual Visa Recognition Deal,” Tashkent Times, November 16, 2018, 
<http://tashkenttimes.uz/national/3192-uzbekistan-kazakhstan-sign-mutual-visa-recognition-deal>. 
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the IMF and the WTO, in which Uzbekistan is considering membership.27 
 Yet, one should be careful not to expect a drastic change in foreign policy. Despite its 
modernization and its craving for investment, it is very unlikely that Uzbekistan will join the 
EEU, at least in the short or medium term. Rather, the trend seems to be that of internationalizing 
the economy while avoiding integrationist projects with the bigger economies of Kazakhstan 
and, most importantly, Russia. At the same time, in the field of security, while it is true that 
Uzbekistan has resumed dialogue on military cooperation with Russia,28 it is unlikely that talks 
on rejoining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) will be resumed any time soon. 
If Uzbekistan’s foreign economic policy has changed, the same cannot be said for the security 
aspect thereof, in which sovereignty prerogatives and defensive neutrality still seem paramount. 
From a multilateral perspective, there are few, but nonetheless important, facts to 
consider. The CSTO has continued military drills and exercises, keeping alive member states’ 
focus on the Afghan problem. 29  However, the organization has been shaken by a severe 
diplomatic row between Armenia and Belarus. Belarus has charged that Armenian leadership is 
not stable enough to hold the chairmanship of the organization. At the same time Belarus has 
tightened relations with Azerbaijan, a non-member of CSTO and Armenia’s rival in regional 
                                                 
27 International Monetary Fund, “Uzbekistan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission,” March 
14, 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/03/14/ms031418-uzbekistan-staff-concluding-statement-of-
the-2018-article-iv-mission>; “World Customs Organization to Assist Uzbekistan’s Accession to WTO,” Azernews, 
November 9, 2018, <https://www.azernews.az/region/140648.html>. 
28 “After Putin’s Visit, Russia’s Footprint in Uzbekistan Is Set to Grow,” October 22, 2018, 
<https://jamestown.org/program/after-putins-visit-russias-footprint-in-uzbekistan-is-set-to-grow/>. 
29 “Lavrov: Post-Soviet Security Bloc’s Top Diplomats Concerned about Afghanistan's North,” TASS, June 11, 2018, 
<http://tass.com/politics/1009094>. 
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politics.30 Another interesting development that has affected multilateralism in the region is the 
possibility that Tajikistan will soon join the EEU. While, as noted above, this may not yet be the 
case for Uzbekistan, a recent study by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
showed the benefits that Tajikistan would get from membership.31 Yet, the organization still 
seems to be fractured and not working smoothly with respect to the free movement of goods, so 
it is possible that Dushanbe will take more time to consider applying for membership. 
The last multilateral development in the region pertains to the agreement that the five 
littoral states of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan reached in August 2018 
with respect to the international legal status of the Caspian Sea.32 Breaking a stalemate which 
lasted more than 20 years, the states finally agreed on how to divide the surface (read: waters) 
and to ban foreign powers from having any military presence in the Caspian. The demarcation of 
the seabed, and the possible construction of pipelines, have been left to bilateral agreements. But 
all the documents pertaining to the construction of pipelines, from environmental impact to 
technical assistance, are to be shared with all the littoral states, despite the bilateral nature of the 
hypothetical agreements. 
                                                 
30 Joshua Kucera, “Pashinyan-Lukashenko Spat Intensifies, Threatening CSTO Schism,” Eurasianet, November 21, 
2018, <https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-lukashenko-spat-intensifies-threatening-csto-schism>. 
31 “Salary of Tajik Migrants May Grow up to 28% after Accession of Tajikistan in EAEU – EBRD,” Kazakh 
Telegraph Agency, November 23, 2018, <https://www.kaztag.kz/en/news/salary-of-tajik-migrants-may-grow-up-to-
28-after-accession-of-tajikistan-in-eaeu-ebrd>. 
32 Qishloq Ovozi, “A Landmark Caspian Agreement: And What It Resolves,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
August 9, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-landmark-caspian-agreement--and-what-it-
resolves/29424824.html>. 
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From an economic perspective, the Central Asian republics experienced a moderate 
growth last year. The economy of Kazakhstan grew 4.3 percent year-on-year in November 
2018, following a 5.2 percent expansion in the previous month. Kazakhstan also recorded a 
government debt equivalent to 17.40 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in 2017, higher than the average of 12.62 percent from 2002 until 2017. The GDP in 
Kyrgyzstan expanded 4.90 percent year-on-year in the first six months of 2018, while 
recording a government debt equivalent to 53.90 percent of the country’s GDP in 2017. 
This is still significantly less than the average value of 71.03 percent from 2000 until 2017. 
Tajikistan’s GDP expanded 7.20 percent in the first half of 2018 over the same period of the 
previous year. Tajikistan also recorded a government debt equivalent to 47.80 percent of 
the country’s GDP in 2017, thus lower than the average of 55.13 percent from 1998 until 
2017. Turkmenistan’s economy rose by 6.20 percent in the second quarter of 2018 over the 
same quarter of the previous year. Yet, Turkmenistan also recorded a government debt 
equivalent to 28.82 percent of the country's GDP in 2017, higher thatn the average value of 
20.93 percent in the last decade. The GDP in Uzbekistan expanded 5.2 percent year-on-year 
in the first nine months of 2018. Uzbekistan also recorded a government debt equivalent to 
24.30 percent of the country's GDP  in 2017, thus in line with the average of 23.95 percent 
from 1998 until 2017.33 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 All economic indicators have been taken from <https://tradingeconomics.com>.  
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